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This contribution explores Wolfgang Pauli’s idea that mind and
matter are complementary aspects of the same reality. We adopt the
working hypothesis that there is an undivided timeless primordial
reality (the primordial “one world”). Breaking its symmetry, we ob-
tain a contextual description of the holistic reality in terms of two
categorically different domains, one tensed and the other tenseless.
The tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time, nonma-
terial processes and mental events. The tenseless domain refers to
matter and physical energy. This concept implies that mind cannot
be reduced to matter, and that matter cannot be reduced to mind.
The non-Boolean logical framework of modern quantum the-
ory is general enough to implement this idea. Time is not taken
to be an a priori concept, but an archetypal acausal order is as-
sumed which can be represented by a one-parameter group of au-
tomorphisms, generating a time operator which parametrizes all
processes, whether material or nonmaterial. The time-reversal sym-
metry is broken in the nonmaterial domain, resulting in a universal
direction of time for the material domain as well.
1. Concepts of Time
1.1 Two Philosophical Conceptions of Time
Discussing questions related to time, we have to distinguish between
two distinct conceptions of time:
• Tensed concepts are generated by relating events to the present.
They include the properties of pastness, nowness, and futurity.
• Tenseless concepts are generated by the relations “earlier than”,
“simultaneous with”, and “later than”.
The question whether time consists only of relations of simultaneity, ear-
lier and later, or whether it also carries the characteristics of futurity,
nowness and pastness is an old controversy in philosophy. This dispute
goes back to Heraclitus, who took the past, present and future to be irre-
ducible, and Parmenides, who opposed the view of Heraclitus and insisted
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hat there is no metaphysical difference between past and future. More
recently, the Cambridge philosopher McTaggart (1908) distinguished be-
tween two modes of perception in terms of what he called A-series and
B-series:
• the A-series relates events in terms of past, present and future,
• the B-series relates events in terms of “earlier than” and “later
than”.
McTaggart used the strange argument that tenses, though essential to
time, are inherently self-contradictory. He concluded that the Heraclitean
concept of an A-series involves an unavoidable contradiction and that only
a tenseless discourse is free from contradiction. But since a Parmenidean
B-theory lacks the tensed features of time, McTaggart maintained that
no fully consistent account of time is possible and that our experience of
events as taking place in time is unreal. Of course, despite such arguments,
many philosophers have remained convinced of the reality of time.
Instead of discussing which of the two viewpoints is the “correct” one,
it is more constructive to consider A-theories and B-theories as different
representations of time, and to ask for their respective domain of validity
and their interdependence (compare Denbigh 1981, chapter 4, §2). While
A-theories refer to the inner experience of time, B-theories refer to changes
in the external world. Very much in outline we may characterize these
two views as follows:
• An A-theory refers to a domain where the notions “now” and “com-
ing into being” are central. Here, A-series are of primary impor-
tance. The consciousness of time as reflecting the “inner flow” of
mental events belongs to this domain.
• In a B-theory events are partially1 ordered in terms of “earlier than”
and “later than”, but without any reference to past, present or fu-
ture. A famous example of a B-theory of time is the special theory
of relativity.2
Even if one considers A-theories as irrelevant for physical sciences, which
do not address issues of becoming, they do not loose their legitimacy
for a general theory of time. In particular, the B-theoretical structure
of physical time is not incompatible with the A-theoretical structure of
psychological time.
1This restriction is necessary since in relativity theory there are temporally incom-
parable events. For a lucid discussion, compare Go¨del (1949), and in particular the
drafts published in Go¨del (1995), pp. 202–259.
2A convinced advocate of the B-theory of time is Gru¨nbaum, who eliminates all
talk of past, present and future, and claims that “becoming” is merely a subjective
feature of consciousness. Compare Gru¨nbaum (1973), chapter 10.
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It is intriguing how many philosophers debate whether the tenseless
theory or the tensed theory of time reflects the world as it really is. This
philosophical debate often confuses two valid, but distinct modes of de-
scription which are not necessarily contradictory. Time, as it is used
in physics omits indexical elements such as the now in the interest of
achieving context-independent and time-independent first principles. Yet,
notions which have no proper place as physical first principles may be es-
sential for understanding the concept of time. They may even be crucial
to understand the mind–matter problem.
1.2 Time in Physics
1.2.1 Time in Galilei- and Lorentz-Relativistic Physics
Both Galilei-relativistic classical and quantum physics are based on
Newton’s idea of an absolute time. In his Principia, Newton (1960,
Scholium, p. 6.) distinguished carefully between “absolute time” and
“common time”:
“Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own
nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by
another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common
time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable)
measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly
used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.”
While Newton’s concept of an absolute time was not generally accepted,
it was vital for the mathematical formulation of physical laws. Later,
in mathematical physics, Newton’s absolute time turned into a param-
eter time t ∈ R, which is a coordinate like those parametrizing three-
dimensional space.
In his theory of relativity Einstein (1916, §9) keeps the common time
which can be measured by clocks associated with local observers, but he
rejects Newton’s notion of an absolute time:
“Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular
time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement
of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an
event.”
In the special theory of relativity there is no unique simultaneity relation
– every inertial system has its own proper time. Moreover, there is no
absolute past, present or future, therefore the now becomes relativized
with respect to a frame of reference. This lends strong support to a B-
theoretical interpretation of time. In 1908 Minkowski realized that in
physics spacetime is more fundamental than time or space separately:3
3Address delivered at the 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physi-
cians, Cologne 1908. English translation quoted from Minkowski (1923), p. 75.
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“Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will
preserve an independent reality.”
In Minkowski’s spacetime world-lines are pictured as existing a priori. We
are moving along a world-line, encountering our pre-determined future as
it becomes present. According to Gru¨nbaum (1973, p. 329 and pp. 318–
319), “coming into being is only coming into awareness”:
“Instead of allowing for the transient division of time into the past
and future by the shifting Now of experienced time, the theory of
relativity conceives of events as simply being and sustaining rela-
tions of earlier and later, but not as ‘coming into being’: we con-
scious organisms then ‘come across’ them by ‘entering’ into their
absolute future, as it were. And upon experiencing their immediate
effects, we regard them as ‘taking place’ or ‘coming into being’.”
1.2.2 Is Time a Parameter or a Dynamical Variable?
In the traditional formulation of Galilei-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics time plays essentially the same role as in classical Galilei-relativistic
point mechanics. The parameter t in the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation refers to an external clock, which is not part of the system de-
scribed by the Hamiltonian in the Schro¨dinger equation. Conventionally,
time is represented by a real number (a “c-number”). Equivalently, one
can represent time in traditional quantum mechanics by a sharp value of
a classical observable.4
Since the advent of relativity theory we know that time is not an
absolute notion. This strongly suggests that the time coordinate should
be treated on the same footing as other dynamical variables.5 In such
an extended quantum mechanics the time operator T still refers to an
external clock time. It is not the canonical conjugate to the Hamiltonian
of the non-extended formulation, so that Pauli’s objection against the
existence of a time operator is inapplicable.6 In the special case where
T is a classical observable, such an extended formulation is equivalent to
the usual formulation with an external time parameter t.7
From a first-principle viewpoint it is usually assumed that classical
observables arise only as emergent quantities in a higher-level description.
4An observable is called classical if it commutes with every other observable.
5In quantum mechanics this idea goes back to Dirac (1927).
6Pauli (1933) (Ziff. 8, p. 140) remarked that the existence of a selfadjoint time
operator conflicts with the semibounded character of the spectrum of the Hamiltonian.
7Nevertheless, this reformulation is conceptually meaningful, for example for the
description of unstable quantum systems in terms of the scattering theory of Lax and
Phillips. Compare Flesia and Piron (1984), Horwitz and Piron (1993), Strauss et
al. (2000). The basic reference for the classical Lax–Phillips scattering theory is Lax
and Phillips (1967).
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Therefore the most basic algebra of observables is taken as a simple al-
gebra, implying that it has a trivial center. Accordingly, we expect that
in a genuinely fundamental theory the time operator is not a classical
observable.
1.2.3 In Fundamental Physical Theories There is No Now
All really fundamental physical dynamical laws are invariant under
time translation and time reversal. Moreover, the concept of the “now”
– the brief interval that divides the past from the future – is absent in
all fundamental mathematical formulations, both in classical physics and
in quantum physics. That is, in a context-independent ontic description
there is no physical basis for the the distinction between past and future.
Carnap (1963, pp. 37–38) reports that this problem of the now worried
Einstein seriously:
“He explained that the experience of the Now means something
special for man, something essentially different from the past and
the future, but that this important difference does not and cannot
occur within physics. That this experience cannot be grasped by
science seemed to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation.
. . . Einstein thought . . . that there is something essential about the
Now which is just outside of the realm of science.”
Referring to the static four-dimensional spacetime of relativity, Einstein
wrote in a letter of condolence to the sister and the son of his lifelong
friend Michele Besso:8
“For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present,
and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.”
Yet, tensed time is a fundamental dimension of psychological reality. We
know immediately and from our own most personal experience that time
flows. It proceeds persistently from the past through the moment of
present into the future. In an operational interpretation of physical theo-
ries this poses no profound problems since the epistemic physical reality
is characterized in terms of events which are localized in space and time
with respect to an observer. In particular, the present and the past are
characterized by procedures associated with experiments performed by
experimenters.
Weyl (1922, p. 3, p. 5; 1949, p. 116) tried to reconcile the tenseless
world of fundamental physics with our tensed experience:
“Pure consciousness” is the seat of that which is philosophically a
priori. . . . Time is the primitive form of the stream of consciousness.
It is a fact, however obscure and perplexing to our minds, that
8Letter of March 21, 1955. Translated from Einstein and Besso (1979), p. 312.
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the contents of consciousness do not present themselves simply as
being (such as conceptions, numbers, etc.), but as being now filling
the form of the enduring present with a varying content. So that
one does not say this is but this is now, yet now no more. If we
project ourselves outside the stream of consciousness and represent
its content as an object, it becomes an event happening in time,
the separate stages of which stand to one another in the relations
of earlier and later.”
“The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the
gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my
body, does a certain section of this world come to life as a fleeting
image in space which continuously changes in time.”
According to Weyl, any explanation of the flow of time must incorporate
the concept of a conscious observer. In a similar way, Augustine suggested
long ago that time may be a dimension of the soul, not of the outer world:9
“But even now it is manifest and clear that there are neither times
future nor times past. Thus it is not properly said that there are
three times, past, present, and future. Perhaps it might be said
rightly that there are three times: a time present of things past; a
time present of things present; and a time present of things future.”
Gru¨nbaum (1971, p. 68) concludes that what is necessary to characterize
a physical event as belonging to the present is “the occurrence of states
of conceptualized awareness”. Gru¨nbaum does not presuppose that con-
ceptualized awareness necessarily requires a biochemical substratum.
1.2.4 The Primacy of Mental Time
The time which is phenomenally known to us is unidirectional and
displays a qualitative difference between “before” and “after”. All engi-
neering science is formulated in terms of a unidirectional time. In mechan-
ical and electrical input–output systems, output values do not depend on
future input values (principle of “retarded causality”). This one-way di-
rection of time which we experience in our everyday lives, and which we
find in phenomenological physical laws, has been called time’s arrow by
Eddington (1928, p. 68). The nature and origin of a temporal asymmetry
in the physical world is a perplexing problem: What is the origin of the
arrow of time? Why do all processes show the same arrow of time? Many
different variants of the physical origin of the direction of time have been
proposed. Of course it is impossible to give a fair review of even the most
relevant approaches.10 We recollect just the most popular ideas:
9Quoted from Augustine (1994), book eleven, chapter XX.
10Important contributions and references to the original papers can be found in stan-
dard references such as Reichenbach (1956), Gold (1967), Gru¨nbaum (1973), Davies
(1974), Denbigh (1981), Hollinger and Zenzen (1985), Horwich (1987), Halliwell et
al. (1994), Savitt (1995), Price (1996), Zeh (1999), Barbour (1999).
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• The causal arrow of time:
In engineering science it is generally assumed that causes always precede
their effects. This view has also been adopted by a number of contempo-
rary philosophers (Suppes 1970, Mellor 1998). An antithetical position
is the causal theory of time. The basic idea is to define temporal order
by ranking events from earlier to later. Kant (Critique of Pure Reason,
B 249) postulated that an event A counts as temporally prior to event
B provided that A is causally prior to B.11 Related versions of a causal
theory of time were developed by a number of more recent philosophers
(Reichenbach 1956, 1958; Gru¨nbaum 1973, chapter 7.) But these ap-
proaches can hardly be considered as successful. Moreover, “causation”
is generally an ill-defined concept in first-principle physics. For this rea-
son, Russell (1913) proposed that the notion of cause is unnecessary for
science, and can therefore be eliminated.
• The manipulative arrow of time:
The idea that the manipulation of a cause will result in the manipulation
of an effect is deeply embedded in experimental science. This conviction
is the cornerstone of the various philosophical accounts of the manip-
ulative approach to causation (Gasking 1955, Price 1992, Menzies and
Price 1993). Yet, this approach leads to an unacceptable anthropocentric
conception of causation (Hausman 1998).
• The arrow of increasing disorder:
The attempt to explain the arrow of time as the direction in which dis-
order increases goes back to Boltzmann (1877). Boltzmann’s ideas are as
controversial today as they were more than hundred years ago, yet they
are still defended (Lebowitz 1993a,b). Boltzmann’s H-theorem is based
on the unjustifiable assumption that the motions of particles are uncorre-
lated before collision. If we assume that the root of temporal asymmetry
lies in such initial conditions, then the asymmetry of the boundary con-
ditions remains unexplained.
• The radiative arrow of time:
The status of the retarded nature of electromagnetic radiation was the
topic of a famous exchange between Ritz and Einstein (1909). Ritz re-
garded it as “law-like”, as one of the roots of the second law of thermo-
dynamics, while Einstein considered it as “fact-like”, following from the
principle of probability increase. But this “fact-like” temporal asymme-
try is purely a matter of asymmetric boundary conditions, which are not
explained.
11For a modern attempt to make Kant’s version of the causal theory of time coherent
compare Carrier (2003).
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• The cosmological arrow of time:
A currently much discussed idea is that the time asymmetry of thermody-
namics and electrodynamics is a result of the expansion of the universe. It
has been claimed “that all the important aspects of time asymmetry en-
countered in the different major topics of physical science may be traced
back to the creation or end of the universe” (Davies 1974, p. 197). Even
if all arrows of time could be reduced to the cosmological arrow (what has
not been shown), one still has to explain why the universe is expanding.
So far, only ad hoc arguments have been presented why the initial entropy
of the universe should be low.
• Weak anthropic principle:
It has been speculated that in a universe, which expands and then even-
tually contracts, intelligent life (and therefore the perception of time) can
only exist during the expanding phase (Hawking 1988, chapter 9).
None of the physical approaches has answered the riddle of the origin
of the asymmetry and the direction of time in a really convincing manner.
All ideas presented are at best tentative. A fully satisfactory explanation
of time asymmetry would have to explain the coincidences of the vari-
ous reasons for the direction of time (i.e., the introspective experience of
the flow of time, the arrow of becoming, the thermodynamic arrow, the
electromagnetic radiation arrow, or the cosmological arrow).
According to Gru¨nbaum, any attempt to determine the “direction”
of time on the basis of physics (and not on the basis of common-sense
notions) is bound to fail (Gru¨nbaum 1973, chapter 10). Since we have
immediate access to tensed temporal relations, our experience of the time
direction has to be considered as primitive and non-inferential. That
is, the temporal direction of events is the order of events based on the
awareness of before and after. In the following I accept the thesis by
Denbigh (1970, p. 243) that
“the criterion of before and after which is offered by consciousness
has a primacy over any criterion offered by science.”
Note that this view does not imply that the now is private to each indi-
vidual observer.
1.3 The Timeless Viewpoint in Depth Psychology
Some psychologists claimed that the idea of a time flux is bound to
the functioning of the conscious mind. For example, Freud argued that
our abstract idea of time seems to be derived from the operation of the
perceptual-conscious system:12
12Translated from Freud (1940a), pp. 27–28, and from Freud (1940b), p. 80.
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“As a result of certain psychoanalytic discoveries, we are today in a
position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian axiom that time
and space are ‘necessary forms of thought’. We have learnt that
unconscious mental processes are in themselves ‘timeless’.”
“. . . There is nothing in the id which can be compared to negation,
and we are astonished to find in it an exception to the philosophers’
assertion that space and time are necessary forms of our mental
acts. In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of time,
no recognition of the passage of time . . . ”
Also Jung maintained that in the deeper layers of the unconscious there
is no time at all:13
“. . . the unconscious has no time. There is no trouble about time in
the unconscious. Part of our psyche is not in time and not in space.
They are only an illusion, time and space, and so in a certain part
of our psyche time does not exist at all.”
Jung called the factors responsible for the organization of unconscious
psychic processes archetypes. He described space and time as manifes-
tations of archetypal elements of the collective unconscious (Jung 1969,
par. 840):
“[Space and time] are, therefore, essentially psychic in origin, which
is probably the reason that impelled Kant to regard them as a priori
categories. But if space and time are only apparently properties
of bodies in motion and are created by the intellectual needs of
the observer, then their relativization by psychic conditions is no
longer a matter for astonishment but is brought within the bounds
of possibility.”
Von Franz (1966, p. 222) concluded:
“All these factors seem to suggest that the time flux, as a subjec-
tive psychological experience, is bound to the functioning of our
conscious mind but becomes relative (or possibly even nonexistent)
in the unconscious.”
Meier (1950, 1975, 1988) suggested that the relation between mind and
matter should be understood as permanently synchronistic. In his mono-
graph on synchronicity, Jung (1969, par. 938, footnote 70) commented:
“I must again stress the possibility that the relation between body
and soul may yet be understood as a synchronistic one. Should this
conjecture ever be proved, my present view that synchronicity is a
relatively rare phenomenon would have to be corrected.”
13Jung (1975), par. 684. Compare also Jung (1958), par. 782, 792, 814.
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2. A Unitary Ground of Mind and Matter
2.1 Mind–Matter Holism
Quantum theory describes the material world in a basically holistic
way. Generalizing this result beyond the material world, we may pon-
der upon a holistic conception concerning mind and matter. Pauli (1994,
p. 260) suggested that the mental and the material domain are governed
by common ordering principles, and should be understood as “comple-
mentary aspects of the same reality”:
“The general problem of the relation between psyche and physis, be-
tween the inner and the outer, can, however, hardly be said to have
been solved by the concept of ‘psychophysical parallelism’ which
was advanced in the last century. Yet modern science may have
brought us closer to a more satisfying conception of this relationship
by setting up, within the field of physics, the concept of comple-
mentarity. It would be most satisfactory of all if physis and psyche
could be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality.”
From his numerous psychological studies, Jung conjectured that there was
a holistic reality – the unus mundus – underlying both mind and matter
(Jung 1970, par. 767):
“Undoubtedly the idea of the unus mundus is founded on the as-
sumption that the multiplicity of the empirical world rests on an
underlying unity, and that not two or more fundamentally different
worlds exist side by side or are mingled with one another. Rather,
everything divided and different belongs to one and the same world,
which is not the world of sense but a postulate whose probability is
vouched for by the fact that until now no one has been able to dis-
cover a world in which the known laws of nature are invalid. That
even the psychic world, which is so extraordinarily different from
the physical world, does not have its roots outside the one cosmos
is evident from the undeniable fact that causal connections exist
between the psyche and the body which point to their underlying
unitary nature.”
But Jung (1975, par. 7) also admitted that any details of such a concept
are still lacking:
“Body and mind are the two aspects of the living being, and that is
all we know. Therefore I prefer to say that the two things happen
together in a miraculous way, and we had better leave it at that,
because we cannot think of them together. For my own use I have
coined a term to illustrate this being together; I say there is a
peculiar principle of synchronicity active in the world so that things
happen together somehow and behave as if they were the same, and
yet for us they are not. Perhaps we shall some day discover a new
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kind of mathematical method by which we can prove that it must
be like that. But for the time being I am absolutely unable to tell
you whether it is the body or the mind that prevails, or whether
they just coexist.”
2.2 Pre-Established Harmony
The idea of psycho-physical parallelism goes back to Leibniz. He
thought of body and soul as two synchronized clocks:14
“Imagine two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. That can
happen in three ways:
(1) The first consists in a mutual influence.
(2) The second is to have a skillful worker continually adjust them
and keep them in agreement.
(3) The third is to manufacture these two time-pieces with so
much art and accuracy that their agreement is guaranteed
thereafter.
Now substitute the soul and body for these two timepieces; their
agreement can be obtained through one of these three ways. The
way of influence is that of popular philosophy; but as we cannot
conceive of material particles which can pass from one of these
substances to another, we must abandon this idea. The way of
the continual assistance of the Creator is that of the system of
occasional causes; but I hold that this introduces Deus ex Machini
in a natural and ordinary occurrence where, according to reason,
it ought not intervene except as it operates in all other natural
things. Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is, the way
of Harmony. From the beginning God has made each of these two
Substances of such a nature that each by following its own laws,
given to it with its being, still agrees with the other, just as though
there were a mutual influence or as though God always took a hand
in it beyond his general supervision of things. There is nothing
further I have to prove, unless you wish to ask that I prove God is
skillful enough to use this prearranged scheme, examples of which
we see even among men. Now assuming that he can, you do see that
this way is most admirable and most worthy of God. You suspected
that my explanation would be opposed by the very different idea we
have of the mind and body; but you see now that nobody has better
established their independence. For while people are compelled to
explain the communication of mind and body by a sort of miracle,
there is cause for many people to fear that the distinction between
soul and body might not be as real as they believe, since they have
to go so far in order to maintain it. I shall not be vexed if learned
persons sound out the thoughts I have just explained to you.”
14Second explanation of the system of the communication of substances, 1715.
Quoted from Wiener (1951), pp. 118–119.
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According to Leibniz, such a pre-established harmony of the soul and the
body is the key to understanding the relationship of mind and body. While
Leibniz’s idea that psychic and physical aspects are perfectly synchronized
without any causal interconnections is radically at variance with classi-
cal physics, it fits well into the theoretical framework of quantum theory.
Leibniz considered neither space nor time as a fundamental feature of re-
ality. Temporal relations are taken to provide a convenient short-hand for
keeping track of the relations among the timeless properties of the world.
According to Leibniz the mind and the body are of radically distinct na-
ture, without any direct causal effect on each other:15
“The soul follows its own peculiar laws and the body also follows its
own laws and they agree in virtue of the pre-established harmony
between all substances, since they are all representations of one and
the same universe.”
2.3 A Timeless Holistic Reality as Point of Departure
Although the descriptions of matter and the descriptions of mind use
some concept of time each, time is neither purely physical nor purely men-
tal. While the experience of time is closely linked to the concepts “now”
and “coming into being”, the omnipresent features of “nowness” and a
“flow of time” have no status whatsoever in physics.16 This situation
suggests to start from a timeless description of the unus mundus. Break-
ing the primordial symmetry of the holistic reality, we obtain contextual
descriptions in terms of two disjoint domains, one tensed and the other
tenseless.
The nonmaterial, tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time,
entities such as the experiential world of perceptions, all kinds of subjec-
tive conscious, subconscious or unconscious experience, explicit and tacit
knowledge, mental processes and personal memory. However, we do not
restrict the tensed domain to the inner world of private thoughts and
experiences. We relate the tensed domain to a mental world which we
consider as fundamental to the nature of existence and being. According
to this view, “mind” operates as a principle beyond individual conscious-
ness and is not restricted to the “human mind”. We do not consider the
differentiation of the mental domain into individual mental egos. Nev-
ertheless, we expect that in the proposed approach subjectively different
“nows” are synchronized so that we do not encounter the problem that
“unsynchronized ‘nows’ unequivocally belong to different worlds” (Franck
2000).
15Monadologie, thesis 78. Quoted from Wiener (1951), p. 549.
16Compare Gru¨nbaum (1967); Denbigh (1970); Gru¨nbaum (1973), chapter 10; Den-
bigh (1978); Denbigh (1981).
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The tenseless domain refers to physical objects. Since “mass and
energy are both but different manifestations of the same thing”,17 all
concepts related to energy are taken to refer to the tenseless domain.
Any higher-level or emergent features in the tensed or in the tenseless
domain will not be discussed in this essay, so that particular relations
between human consciousness and human brain are not addressed.
In the following we explore, on the basis of the most fundamental first
principles of quantum theory, Leibniz’s idea that mind and matter are cat-
egorically distinct, and have no direct causal effect on each other, although
they are perfectly correlated.18 Our point of departure is the hypothesis
that there is a timeless holistic reality which can be described in terms
of the non-Boolean logical structure of modern quantum theory. Neither
time, nor mind, nor matter and energy are taken to be a priori concepts.
Rather, it is assumed that these concepts emerge by a contextual breaking
of the holistic symmetry of the unus mundus. This symmetry breaking
is not unique; there may be different separations, leading to complemen-
tarity descriptions of the unus mundus which do not use the concepts
“mental” and “material”.
2.4 A Quantum Theoretical Approach
In the following we analyze the aforesaid problems in the language
of quantum theory. We adopt only the most fundamental structures
of quantum theory, but to simplify matters we use the familiar Hilbert-
space formalism of traditional quantum mechanics and the Kolmogorov–
Re´nyi probability theory. This is presumably inappropriate since these
formalisms refer to either a non-Boolean or a Boolean statistical descrip-
tion, but not to an individual description. In an explorative study this
inconsistency may be tolerated. A properly elaborated discussion should,
however, start with a basic non-statistical C*-formalism and the non-
probabilistic concept of individual chaotic function in the sense of Wiener.
If desired, epistemic W*-algebraic descriptions can then be introduced by
an appropriate GNS-construction. Such a procedure is mathematically
more involved, but I see no major difficulty to accomplish it in a more
definitive discussion.
We assume that the description of the timeless holistic reality is invari-
ant under the action of the group representing the primordial symmetry
of the unus mundus. The crucial problem is then to explain the emergence
of time from a timeless theory. The main idea is that time arises from the
entanglement of the decomposition of the timeless universe of discourse
17Einstein’s formulation, taken from the soundtrack of the film Atomic Physics
(1948), accesssible at http://www.aip.org/history/einstein/voice1.htm.
18We do not, however, follow Leibniz into the peculiarities of his system.
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into a tensed nonmaterial and a tenseless material part.19 The mind–
matter distinction will be described by a tensor-product decomposition
of the Hilbert space H of the primordial timeless reality. In a quantum
theoretical framework, the basic requirements for a description of a mind–
matter distinction, applied to the unus mundus, can be summarized as
follows:
1. The primordial, timeless universe of discourse can be quantum the-
oretically described in terms of a separable Hilbert space H. This
universe of discourse is conceived as a strictly closed system without
any external interactions or external correlations. In this framework,
mind and matter are not yet differentiated.
2. The Hilbert space H of the timeless universe of discourse can be
represented as a tensor product N⊗M , where the Hilbert space N
refers to the tensed nonmaterial domain, while the Hilbert spaceM
refers to the tenseless material domain.
3. The archetypal structure element responsible for the acausal or-
deredness of the two domains of mind and matter is given by the
symmetry of the continuum.20 This symmetry is represented by the
additive group of real numbers, realized by a one-parameter group of
automorphisms of the algebra B(H) of all bounded operators acting
in the Hilbert space H. Such an automorphism can be implemented
by the unitary group {e−2πiτG|τ ∈ R}, where τ is an order param-
eter and G is the selfadjoint generator of the symmetry group of
the primordial unity. Since an automorphism does not change any
structural relation, but simply connects equivalent descriptions, the
action of the unitary group {e−2πiτG|τ ∈ R} only refers to a change
of viewpoint.
4. The concept of pre-established harmony is implemented by a thor-
ough entanglement of the quantum state of the timeless universe of
discourse with respect to the tensorization N⊗M .
19Most discussions of the emergence of time are related to cosmological studies;
compare the review by Isham (1994). Usually, such studies of the “problem of time” use
an ad hoc semiclassical approximation which promotes time to a classical observable.
According to our proposal, the emergence of time is not primarily related to cosmology.
It is a pure quantum phenomenon, leading to a non-classical time.
20Jung (1969, par. 870) suggested that the natural numbers were the most primitive
element of order in the human mind. But according to Pauli (1994, p. 160) “a more
general concept ‘archetype’ . . . ought to be formulated in such a way that ‘primitive
mathematical intuition’ comes within its scope – an intuition manifesting itself for in-
stance in arithmetic in the idea of the infinite series of the integers, and in geometry
in the idea of the continuum.” The later Frege, after admitting his failure to derive
arithmetic from pure logic, proposed that arithmetic must have a geometrical founda-
tion (compare Frege, Numbers and Arithmetic, reprinted in Frege, 1997, pp. 275–277).
We adopt this point of view.
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5. In this preliminary study we assume that the nonmaterial and the
material domain do not interact.21 In this case the unitary operator
e−2πiτG of the representation of the archetypal symmetry is given
by
e−2πiτG = e−2πiτΛ ⊗ e−2πiτH/ , τ ∈ R , (2.1)
so that the selfadjoint generator G of the underlying symmetry
group of the timeless universe of discourse is of the form
G = Λ⊗ 1+ 1⊗H/h . (2.2)
Here H is the Hamiltonian of the material domain and h is Planck’s
constant 2π. We assume that Planck’s constant refers only to
matter and radiation, so we do not include it in the generator Λ
for the nonmaterial domain.
3. The Description of the Tensed Domain
3.1 The Tensed Structure of the Nonmaterial Domain
Neither nowness nor consciousness can be identified with any property
known to physics, so we relate these phenomena to the nonmaterial do-
main. Since mental phenomena are closely related to time,22 we assume
that A-series phenomena can be described within the nonmaterial domain.
Instead of thinking of time as a “stream that flows” it is more fruitful to
adopt the idea that the stock of memories increases. The essence of such
a mental time is the now – the past is stored in the present memory, while
the future is not. It corresponds to Leibniz’s order of succession:23
“Time is the order of non-contemporaneous things. It is thus the
universal order of change in which we ignore the specific kind of
changes that have occurred.”
The A-series does not refer to physical or physiological clocks, but
is synchronized with the time concepts of the material domain via an
entanglement between the nonmaterial and the material domain. There-
fore, the nonmaterial time system cannot be a classical system (described
21This assumption is not crucial. There are special interactions which do neither
affect the synchronization of the tensed and tenseless domains nor the conservation
laws of the material domain, but nevertheless permit influences between the tensed
and the tenseless domain. Such interactions may be important for the problem how
mental events relate to physical events, but this question will not be dealt with in this
exploratory study.
22For example, Augustine (1994, book eleven, chapter XXVI) asks whether spirit
itself is time.
23Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics, 1715. Quoted from Wiener (1951),
p. 202.
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by a commutative algebra) since a quantum system cannot be entangled
with a classical system.24 Hence, an appropriate time system has to be
characterized by a noncommutative algebra. We will generate this non-
commutative structure of the nonmaterial time system by a Hilbert-space
representation of a two-parameter non-Abelian time group.
3.2 The Time System in the Nonmaterial Domain
3.2.1 The Time Operator of the Nonmaterial Domain
Any subspace of the Hilbert space N of the tensed nonmaterial do-
main characterizes a set of particular mental events. We represent mental
activities in terms of subspaces N ′,N ′′, . . . of the Hilbert space N . With
respect to the inclusion relation ⊆ the subspaces N ′,N ′′, . . . form an or-
thomodular lattice L(N ) with the intersection N ′∧N ′′ as the greatest
lower bound, and the closure N ′∨N ′′ of the union of N ′ and N ′′ as the
least upper bound. It is consistent to interpret the elements of L(N ) as
attributes where N ′ ⊆ N ′′ means that the attribute N ′′ is superordinate
to the attribute N ′.25 The fact that the lattice L(N ) is not distributive
implies that there exist incompatible attributes.
The history of nonmaterial processes can be conceived by a family
{Nτ | τ ∈ R} of closed subspaces of the Hilbert space N of the nonmaterial
domain. The subspace Nτ ⊂ N will be used to characterize the set of
mental events available in a nonmaterial memory at τ . Here, the real
number τ characterizes the now. The chronological order and the forward
motion of time will be related to the growth of Nτ :
τ ′′ > τ ′ if and only if Nτ ′′ ⊃ Nτ ′ . (3.1)
Evidently, Nτ cannot increase as τ decreases, so that the remote past∧
τ∈RNτ is a well-determined subspace of N . Since it represents the τ -
independent portion of N , we call it the innate part Ninn of N , excluding
any features of novelty. It satisfies
Ninn :=
∧
τ∈RNτ ⊂ Nτ ⊂ N for every τ ∈ R . (3.2)
We call the orthogonal complement of Ninn in N the acquired part Nacq
of N , containing elements of N which are due to novelty,
Nacq := N Ninn . (3.3)
24Theorem: LetM1 andM2 be W*-algebras, andM1⊗¯M2 their W*-tensor product.
Then every pure normal state functional on M1⊗¯M2 is a product state functional if
and only if either M1 or M2 is commutative. Compare Raggio (1988). For singular
states the corresponding theorem is: Let A1 and A2 be C*-algebras. Then every pure
state functional on the minimal C*-tensor product A1 ⊗ A2 is a product state if and
only if either A1 or A2 is commutative. Compare Takesaki (1979), theorem 4.14, p. 211.
25For details, compare Scheibe (1973), p. 137, and in particular Kanthack and We-
gener (1976).
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If Nτ is independent of τ , then there are no novelty acquirements, so that
Ninn equals N .
Let Pinn be the orthogonal projection operator from N onto the sub-
space Ninn and let Pτ be the orthogonal projection operator from N
onto the subspace Nτ . Then the orthogonal projectors Eτ defined by
Pτ = 1⊕Eτ form a spectral family acting on the Hilbert space Nacq. We




e2πiλτ dEτ , λ ∈ R , (3.4)
generating a unitary one-parameter group U := {U(λ) |λ ∈ R}, called the
frequency-translation group, which is assumed to be strongly continuous.




τ dEτ , U(λ) = e2πiλT . (3.5)
The unitary one-parameter group U := {U(λ) |λ ∈ R} is a representation
of the Abelian group R on the Hilbert space Nacq. It describes the acausal
orderedness of the unus mundus.
3.2.2 Time–Frequency Complementarity
In the multiplication representation of the time operator T on the
Lebesgue space L2(R, dx) of square-integrable complex-valued functions
x → Φ(x) on the real axis R,{
U(λ)Φ}(x) = e2πiλx Φ(x) x, λ ∈ R , Φ ∈ L2(R, dt) , (3.6)
we define a family of unitary shift operators V (τ) by{
V (τ)Φ
}
(x) = Φ(x− τ) , x, τ ∈ R , Φ ∈ L2(R, dt) . (3.7)
These operators generate a canonically conjugated unitary one-parameter
group V := {V (τ) | τ ∈ R}, called the time-translation group. The shift
operator V (τ) generates a canonical system of imprimitivities26
V (τ)∗ T V (τ) = T + τ , τ ∈ R . (3.8)
26In the context of regular stochastic processes this imprimitivity relation has been
recognized by Hanner (1950; eq. 2.3, p. 163) and by Kallianpur and Mandrekar (1965;
p. 560). The time operator itself has been introduced by Tjøstheim (1975, 1976a,
1976b), who also discussed the canonical commutation relation between the time
and the frequency operator. Independently, these relations have also been found by
Gustafson and Misra (1976).
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The frequency-translation group U := {U(λ) |λ ∈ R} and the canonically
conjugated time-translation group V := {V (τ) | τ ∈ R} are related by
Weyl’s canonical commutation relations27
U(λ)V (τ) = e2πiλτ V (τ)U(λ) , λ, τ ∈ R . (3.9)
The equivalent formulation in terms of the unitary Weyl operators
W (λ, τ) := eπiλτ V (τ)U(λ) , λ, τ ∈ R , (3.10)
realizes the commutation relations of the noncommutative Heisenberg
group:
W (λ, τ)W (λ′, τ ′)
= eπi(λτ
′−τλ′)W (λ+ λ′, τ + τ ′) , λ, λ′, τ, τ ′ ∈ R . (3.11)
Both strongly continuous unitary one-parameter groups {U(λ) |λ ∈ R}
and {V (τ) | τ ∈ R} are realizations of the commutative group R. Stone’s
theorem allows the representations
U(λ) = W (λ, 0) = e2πiλT , V (τ) = W (0, τ) = e−2πiτΛ , (3.12)
W (λ, τ) = e2πiλT−2πiτΛ . (3.13)
The generator Λ is called the frequency operator. It is unitarily equivalent
to the time operator T . Both Λ and T are unbounded selfadjoint operators
with the simple, absolutely continuous spectrum R. On an appropriate
domain they fulfill the relations
e2πiτΛ f(T ) e−2πiτΛ = f(T + τ) , τ ∈ R , (3.14)
e−2πiλT g(Λ) e2πiλT = g(Λ+ λ) , λ ∈ R , (3.15)
T Λ− ΛT = (i/2π) 1 . (3.16)
3.3 The Basic Time Translation/Scaling Group
3.3.1 The Extended Affine Group
We achieve a conceptually deeper understanding if we replace the two-
parameter Heisenberg group (describing time and frequency translations)
by the only other two-dimensional simply-connected Lie group, the two-
parameter affine group (acting as a scale-translation group). For x, s, τ ∈
R, the assignment x → esx + τ is a permutation R → R, so that the
mapping {e2πiλT |λ ∈ R} → {e2πiλ(esT+τ) |λ ∈ R} is an automorphism of
27Weyl (1927). Compare also Weyl (1928), chapter IV, section D, §45 (in the English
edition: chapter IV, section D, §14).
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the Abelian group generated by the time operator T . That is, the time
operator T is invariant under the group of affine transformations of the
real line R preserving the orientation. The transformed time operator
esT + τ refers to a change in origin τ ∈ R and to a change of scale by the
factor es > 0. Since T and esT lead to equivalent descriptions, it makes
no sense to speak of a “rate” of the flow of time.
While the non-Abelian two-parameter Heisenberg group is isomor-
phic to R2 with addition as the group operation, the non-Abelian two-
parameter affine group is isomorphic to the group of all linear transfor-
mations x → esx + τ of the real line R. If we complement the group of
affine transformations T → esT + τ by the time-reversal transformation
T → −T we get the non-Abelian extended affine group
{g(s, τ, j) | s, τ ∈ R, j = ±1} , (3.17)
which we consider as the fundamental group of time. Its group operations
are given by
g(s, τ, j) ◦ g(s′, τ ′, j′) = g(s+ s′, τ + jesτ ′, jj′) , (3.18)
where g(0, 0,+1) is the identity and g(0, 0,−1) represents the time re-
versal operation. The extended affine group has two connected compo-
nents. The connected component containing the identity is the affine
group {g(s, τ, 1) | s, τ ∈ R}. It is a continuous, infinite, non-unimodular
non-Abelian locally compact group. It is the semidirect product of the
scaling group {g(s, 0, 1) | s ∈ R} (which describes the scalings T → es T )
and the translation group {g(0, τ, 1) | τ ∈ R} (which describes the trans-
lations T → T + τ). Both these subgroups are isomorphic to the commu-
tative additive group R of the real numbers.
3.3.2 Hilbert-Space Realization of the Time Group
The extended affine group {g(s, τ, j) | s, τ ∈ R, j = ±1} can be rep-
resented on the Hilbert space Nacq by operators G(s, τ, j), realizing the
group relations (3.18) by the commutation relation
G(s, τ, j)G(s′, τ ′, j′) = G(s+ s′, τ + jesτ ′, jj′) , (3.19)
We can obtain a more explicit representation by studying the scaling
subgroup {Y (s) | s ∈ R} with Y (s) := G(s, 0, 1), the translation group
{V (τ) | τ ∈ R} with V (τ) := G(0, τ, 1), and the time-reversal group
{G(0, 0, j) | j = ±1}. The scaling group {Y (s) | s ∈ R} and the trans-
lation group {V (τ) | τ ∈ R} are strongly continuous commutative unitary
one-parameter groups on the Hilbert space Nacq, fulfilling the commuta-
tion relations
Y (s)Y (s′) = Y (s+ s′) , V (τ)V (τ ′) = V (τ + τ ′) ,
V (τ)Y (s) = Y (s)V (esτ) . (3.20)
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Stone’s theorem allows the introduction of selfadjoint generators Λ and B
by
V (τ) = e−2πiτΛ , Y (s) = e2πisB , τ, s ∈ R . (3.21)
The operator B is unitarily equivalent to the operator Λ; both of them
have the purely continuous spectrum R. The group relation e−2πiτΛe2πisB
= e2πisBe−2πie
sτΛ implies, on an appropriate domain, the following com-
mutation relation for the generators:[
B,Λ
]
− = (i/2π)Λ . (3.22)
In terms of the selfadjoint operators Λ and T one can express the selfad-
joint generator B of the unitary scaling group by
B = 12 (ΛT + TΛ) . (3.23)
The canonical commutation relation [T,Λ ]−= (i/2π)1 implies[
B , T
]
− = − (i/2π)T , (3.24)
so that the unitary one-parameter scaling group {exp(2πisB) | s ∈ R}
scales the operators T and Λ as follows:
e2πisB T e−2πisB = es T , e2πisBΛe−2πisB = e−sΛ , s ∈ R (3.25)
In an irreducible Hilbert-space representation on Nacq, the time rever-
sal can be implemented by an antilinear and antiunitary operator J ,
A→ JAJ−1 for all A ∈ B(Nacq) . (3.26)
The operator J fulfills
J(aΨ + b Φ) = a∗J Ψ + b∗J Φ , 〈JΦ|JΨ〉 = 〈Φ|Ψ〉∗ = 〈Ψ |Φ〉 (3.27)
for all Ψ,Φ ∈ Nacq and a, b ∈ C.28 The square of J is a unitary operator
which for spin-free systems has the property J2 = 1. By definition, the
time operator T changes sign under time reversal, T (T ) = JTJ−1 =
−T , so that the canonical commutation relations determine the following
behavior of generators of the affine and the Heisenberg group under time
reversal:
J TJ−1 = −T , J e+2πiλTJ−1 = e+2πiλT , J U(λ)J−1= U(λ) , (3.28)
J ΛJ−1 = Λ , J e−2πiτΛJ−1 = e+2πiτΛ , J V (τ)J−1 = V (−τ) , (3.29)
J BJ−1 = −B , J e+2πiλBJ−1= e+2πiλB , J Y (s)J−1 = Y (s) . (3.30)
28Wigner (1932). Compare also Wigner (1959), chapter 26.
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With the group multiplication laws (3.20) of the affine group and the
relations (3.29), (3.30), and J2= 1, we find that the commutation relation
(3.19) of the extended affine group is fulfilled by
G(s, τ, j) := V (τ)Y (s)
{
δ+1,j 1+ δ−1,j J
}
. (3.31)
3.3.3 Lebesgue-Space Representation of the Time Group
For an explicit evaluation of the time system it is convenient to re-
alize the Hilbert space Nacq by the Lebesgue space L2(R, dx) of square-




(x) = Φ(x− τ) , x, τ ∈ R , (3.32){
Y (s)Φ
}
(x) = es/2 Φ(esx) , x, s ∈ R , (3.33){
J Φ
}
(x) = Φ(−x)∗ , x ∈ R , (3.34){
U(λ)Φ}(x) = e2πiλx Φ(x) , x, λ ∈ R . (3.35)
The generators of the unitary operators V (τ) = e−2πiτΛ, Y (s) = e2πisB ,
and U(λ) = e2πiλT are unbounded selfadjoint operators which are well-
defined on the Schwartz space S(R) of all rapidly decreasing complex-
valued infinitely differentiable functions on R. For every Φ ∈ S(R) ⊂



























(x) = x Φ(x) , x ∈ R . (3.38)
3.4 Nonmaterial Processes
3.4.1 Innate and Novelty-Acquiring Processes
Processes in the nonmaterial domain can be described by complex-
valued functions τ → x(τ) ∈ N . Every element x of the Hilbert space
N can be regarded as representing an equivalence class of complex-valued
random variables with zero mean, E{x} = 0, and finite variance E{|x|2} <
∞ . The covariance is defined in terms of the inner product 〈·|·〉 of the
Hilbert space N by E{x∗y} := 〈x|y〉 . A family of elements x(τ) ∈ N ,
where τ varies over the real axis R, is called a zero-mean second order
stochastic process. When τ varies over R, the stochastic process can be
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considered as a curve in the Hilbert space N . A zero-mean second order
stochastic process {x(τ) | τ ∈ R} is said to be weakly stationary if its
covariance function is invariant under the shift transformation, i.e. if for
all τ, τ ′, s ∈ R we have E{x(τ + s)∗ x(τ ′ + s)} = E{x(τ)∗ x(τ ′)}.
The history of the process {x(τ)} is given by N (∞) := ∨τN (−∞, τ),
where the family of Hilbert spacesN (−∞, τ) is defined as the closed linear
subspace of N generated by the family {x(τ ′) | τ ′ ≤ τ},
N (−∞, τ) := closed span {x(τ ′) | −∞ ≤ τ ′ ≤ τ} , (3.39)
The Hilbert space N (−∞, τ) is called the past and present up to τ . Since
the family {N (−∞, τ) | τ ∈ R} of Hilbert spaces N (−∞, τ) is monotoni-
cally increasing, the remote past
N (−∞) := ∧τ≤0N (−∞, τ) (3.40)
is well defined. Two extreme cases may occur:
if N (−∞) = N , then the process {x(τ) | τ ∈ R} is called singular, (3.41)
if N (−∞) = {0}, then the process {x(τ) | τ ∈ R} is called regular. (3.42)
Here {0} is the null space consisting only of the random variable which is
almost always equal to zero. Since the remote past of a singular process
contains all information necessary for the whole development of the pro-
cess, singular processes are also called deterministic. In our context they
correspond to innate processes. A regular process is also called “com-
pletely nondeterministic” because its far future is essentially independent
of the present, so that long-term predictions are not feasible.29 In our
context regular processes correspond to novelty-acquiring processes.
Every nonmaterial process {x(τ) | τ ∈ R} can be uniquely represented
as the orthogonal sum of a singular process xsing ∈ Ninn and a regular
process xreg ∈ Nacq .30 Let P−∞ be the orthogonal projection operator
from N onto the remote past N (−∞). With xsing := P−∞ x and xreg :=
(1− P−∞)x we can write
x = xsing + xreg . (3.43)
29The concept of regularity of one-dimensional stationary processes with discrete
time has been introduced by Kolmogorov (1941). Kolmogorov’s analysis was based
on the fundamental decomposition theorem by Wold (1938). In Wold’s thesis the two
components were called singular and regular, the synonymous terms deterministic and
nondeterministic were introduced by Doob (1944). In response to a question raised by
Kolmogorov, Kre˘ın (1945a,b) showed how to transfer Kolmogorov’s results for discrete
time to continuous time by a simple transformation.
30This decomposition is due to Wold (1938) for the special case of discrete-time
stationary processes, and to Hanner (1950) for the case of continuous-time processes.
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This Wold decomposition implies that the Hilbert space N of the nonma-
terial domain has the decomposition
N := Ninn ⊕Nacq with xsing ∈ Ninn , xreg ∈ Nacq . (3.44)
3.4.2 Nonmaterial K-Structures
The development of a novelty-acquiring stationary process {xreg(τ) |
τ ∈ R} with zero mean and finite variance is given by the time-translation
group V
xreg(τ) = V (τ)xreg(0) , V (τ) ∈ V . (3.45)
In the Hilbert space Nacq we select the closed subspace N+ defined by
N+ := closed span {x reg(τ ′) | −∞ ≤ τ ′ ≤ 0 } . (3.46)
Then the strongly continuous one-parameter group V := {V (τ) | τ ∈ R}
generates a forward expanding Hilbert-space K-structure31 {Nacq,N+,V},
characterized by the conditions:
• N+ ⊆ V (τ)N+ for all τ ≥ 0 , (3.47)
• ∧τ≤0V (τ)N+ = {0} , (3.48)





the closure of the union. It follows
that a stationary nonmaterial process with zero mean and finite variance
is novelty-acquiring (i.e. regular) if and only if {N ,N (−∞, 0),V} is a
forward expanding Hilbert-space K-structure.
For everyHilbert-space K-structure {Nacq,N+,V} there exists a unique
strongly continuous one-parameter group U := {U(λ) |λ ∈ R} of unitary
operators on N , which satisfies Weyl’s canonical commutation relations32
U(λ)V (τ) = e2πiλτ V (τ)U(λ) , λ, τ ∈ R . (3.50)
3.4.3 Canonical Representations of Nonmaterial Processes
Every stationary continuous regular process {xreg(τ) | τ ∈ R} with





R(τ − τ ′) dw(τ ′) , (3.51)
31Compare Lewis and Thomas (1974). For our purpose the expanding K-structure
N+ ⊆ V (τ)N+ is appropriate, while in the scattering theory by Lax and Phillips
(1967) contracting K-structures N+ ⊆ V (τ)N+ are used.
32Compare for example Cornfeld et al. (1982), p. 457.
33This result is due to Hanner (1950). For important generalizations compare Hida
(1960), Crame´r (1961a,b). In the context of statistical prediction theory Masani and
Wiener (1959) called a non-anticipative one-sided moving-average representation an
innovation representation. For details compare the monograph by Rozanov (1967).
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where τ → R(τ) is a non-random Borel measurable weighting function
and τ → w(τ) is a Wiener process with uncorrelated increments,
E{|dw(τ)|2} = dτ , E{dw(τ) dw(τ ′)} = δ(τ − τ ′) dτ dτ ′ . (3.52)
In engineering science the process τ → dw(τ)/dτ is called white noise.
A rigorous definition of white noise can be given in terms of Gel’fand
triples.34 On the Gel’fand triple S(R) ⊂ L2(R) ⊂ S∗(R) white noise
can be generated by an automorphic dynamical system. Here S(R) is
the Schwartz space of real-valued rapidly decreasing infinitely often dif-
ferentiable functions on R, L2(R) is the Hilbert space of Lebesgue square-
integrable functions on R, and S∗ is the strong dual of S(R), that is,
the Schwartz space of tempered distributions on R. Let Σ(a, b) be the
σ-field generated by white noise τ → dw(τ)/dτ in the interval [a, b]. It fol-
lows that white noise generates the memoryless forward expanding Hilbert-
space K-structure
{
L2(S∗,Σ,µ),L2(S∗,Σ(−∞, 0),µ), {V | τ ∈ R}}.35
The representation (3.51) can be interpreted as a non-anticipative
input–output map producing the trajectories of a novelty-acquiring pro-
cess in response to the application of a particular white noise trajectory at
the input. However, in contrast to engineering systems, the “input” can-
not be assigned arbitrarily from the outside. The fact that every novelty-
acquiring nonmaterial process has a representation in terms of white noise
suggests that the memoryless K-system generated by white noise can be
considered as an intrinsic structure element of the nonmaterial domain.
Every memory function τ → R(τ) generates a particular nonmaterial pro-
cess which may be used for descriptions of higher-level mental phenomena.
The question whether such mental processes are correlated with material
processes can be investigated only if more details about the structure of
the nonmaterial domain are available.
3.5 Breaking the Time-Reversal Symmetry
3.5.1 Time Symmetries
First principles are always characterized by a high degree of symmetry.
The reason why we prefer a symmetric time concept in fundamental ontic
descriptions has been stated by Poincare´:36
“Time must be defined in such a way that the
statements of the natural laws be as simple as possible.”
Starting with a description of a timeless universe of discourse, we intro-
duced the concept of time via an intrinsic one-parameter group of auto-
morphisms. This approach yields two basic time symmetries:
34Compare for example Gel’fand and Vilenkin (1964), chapter III; or Hida (1980),
section 3.4.
35Compare also Hida (1980), p. 146.
36Translated from Poincare´ (1899), p. 6.
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1. The fundamental dynamical equations are invariant under transla-
tions t→ t′ = t+a, a ∈ R. This invariance is called time-translation
symmetry.
2. The fundamental dynamical equations are invariant under an invo-
lution which changes the time parameter t to −t.37 This invariance
is called time-reversal symmetry.
For time-reversal invariant systems there is a distinction between past
and future, but no distinction between cause and effect. The success
of phenomenological nonanticipative physical descriptions suggests that
in epistemic descriptions the time-reversal symmetry is always broken.
Likewise, conscious perception, cognition and communication presupposes
the usual forward direction of time, distinguishing memory of the past
from anticipation of the future.
3.5.2 Why Do All Processes Show the Same Arrow of Time?
The phenomenon of symmetry breaking is well-understood in modern
physical theories. Nevertheless, an important problem remains unsolved.
The time-reversal symmetry is represented by a group of order two. If the
time-reversal symmetry is broken one gets two representations. One of
them satisfies the generally accepted rules of retarded causality, the other
one satisfies the strange rules of advanced causality. In our description of




R(τ − τ ′) dw(τ ′)
manifests the breaking of the time-reversal symmetry of the underlying
unitary time-evolution group V := {V (τ) | τ ∈ R} of the forward expand-
ing Hilbert-space K-structure {Nacq,N+,V} and the associated novelty-
acquiring processes in the nonmaterial domain. A backward expanding
Hilbert-space K-structure would lead to nonmaterial processes character-
ized by an anticipating canonical backward representation of the type∫ ∞
τ
R(τ − τ ′) dw(τ ′) .
The usual choice of retarded causality in the material domain can-
not be explained by a statistical mechanical formulation of the “second
37The time-reversal transformation is an involution, i.e. an operation whose square
is the identity. The involution associated with time-reversal does not only change the
direction of time but also associated quantities like the velocity, the momentum, the
angular momentum, the electric current and the magnetic field. In elementary particle
physics, the invariant involution PCT associated with time reversal T (T 2 = 1) also
involves space reflection P (P 2 = 1) and charge conjugation C (C2 = 1) (PCT -
theorem).
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law” without an a priori postulate imposing an asymmetric evolution to-
ward increasing time. Thus, the decision which of the two possibilities is
appropriate is not derivable from the first principles of physics.
While in classical physics a breaking of the time-reversal symmetry
permits that two noninteracting subsystems have different directions of
the time arrow, this is in general impossible in quantum theory. The fact
that even noninteracting subsystems of a quantum system are in general
entangled implies that in quantum theory the time-reversal operation is
global. The reason is that for quantum systems the time-reversal map is
positive but not completely positive. Therefore it is impossible to define a
local time-reversal operation for one subsystem only.
This can be explained in detail in the C*-algebraic description of phys-
ical systems, where the time reversal is represented by an involutary anti-
automorphism T : A→ A of the underlying C*-algebra A,
T (A∗) = T (A)∗ , T (AB) = T (B)T (A) , T {T (A)} = A , A,B ∈ A .
The time-reversal map T is positive, but for quantum systems (where A
is noncommutative) the map T is not completely positive.38 That is, if
(A1, T1) and (A2, T2) describe two noninteracting quantum systems, then
the local map T1⊗12 and the local map 11⊗T2 on the minimal C*-tensor
product A1⊗ A2 are not positive, hence they are not time-reversal maps.
The time-reversal map for the composite quantum system is given by the
global positive map
(T1 ⊗ 12)(11⊗ T2) = T1 ⊗ T2 .
This implies that, even if the two quantum systems do not interact, the
time-reversal for the first quantum system is not given by T1 ⊗ 12. The
map T1 ⊗ 12 represents the time-reversal operator for the first subsystem
if and only if the two systems are not entangled. In an entangled system
with broken time-reversal symmetry the direction of the arrow of time has
to point to the same direction for all (even noninteracting) subsystems.
4. Mind–Matter Entanglement
4.1 An Intrinsic Symmetry of the Timeless Unus Mundus
We write the generator G of the underlying symmetry group of the
timeless universe of discourse in the form
G = Λ⊗ 1+ 1⊗H/h . (4.1)
38A linear map T : A → A is said to be completely positive if the linear map
T ⊗ 1n : A⊗B(Cn) → A⊗B(Cn) is positive for all n ≥ 1, where B(Cn) is the C*-
algebra of all complex n× n-matrices and 1n is the identity transformation of B(Cn)
onto itself.
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where H is the Hamiltonian of the material domain and h is Planck’s
constant 2π. We assume that Planck’s constant refers only to matter
and radiation, so it is not included in the generator Λ of the nonmaterial
domain. The selfadjoint operator G generates a one-parameter group
{ατ | τ ∈ R} of automorphisms ατ of the algebraB(N⊗M) of all bounded
operators acting on the Hilbert space N⊗M by
ατ (X) = e2πiτGX e−2πiτG , X ∈ B(N⊗M) , τ ∈ R . (4.2)
For A ∈ B(N ) and B ∈ B(M) we get
ατ
(
A⊗B) = (e2πiτΛAe−2πiτΛ)⊗ (eiτH/B e−iτH/) . (4.3)
4.2 Maximally Entangled Quantum States
A state which cannot be represented as a product state with respect
to the tensorization N ⊗ M is called an entangled state (Schro¨dinger
1935). We describe the state of the timeless universe of discourse by a
continuous superposition of the product state vectors e−2πiτG Φ ⊗ Ψ =







)⊗ (e−iτH/ Ψ) dτ , (4.4)
where τ → g(τ) is some complex-valued weight function on R. The refer-
ence vector Ψ ∈M specifies the possible states of the material system. It
corresponds to the initial state vector of the material system in traditional
quantum theoretical descriptions with an external parameter time.
The Leibnizian requirement of a perfect pre-established harmony be-
tween the mental time and the material time demands a maximally en-
tangled state vector Ξ. A time-entangled state is said to be maximally
entangled if |g(τ)| = 1 for all τ ∈ R. The further prerequisite that the
description of the timeless universe of discourse is invariant under the ac-
tion of the unitary group {e−2πiτG | τ ∈ R} implies that e−2πiτGΞ = Ξ,
so that g ≡ 1.
4.3 Covariant Reference States
We demand that the reference state vector Φ of the time system trans-
forms covariantly under the time-translation group. This is fulfilled by
any coherent state vector Φ = |λ, t 〉 ∈ N related to the Heisenberg group:
e−2πiτΛ |λ, t〉 = e−πiτλ |λ, t+ τ〉 . (4.5)
In terms of the temporal Weyl system (3.10) a coherent state vector is
defined by
|λ, t 〉 := W (λ, t)|0, 0 〉 , λ, t ∈ R , (4.6)
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where the reference state vector |0, 0 〉 ∈ N is defined by the state-
generating function
〈0, 0|W (λ, t)|0, 0〉 = exp
{
− 2π2σ2Tλ2 − 2π2σ2Λ t2
}
,
σTσΛ = 1/(4π) , (4.7)
The mean values λ, t ∈ R and the standard deviations σT > 0, σΛ > 0
with respect to the coherent states are given by
λ := 〈λ, t |Λ |λ, t〉 , t := 〈λ, t |T |λ, t〉 , (4.8)
σ2Λ := 〈λ, t | (Λ− λ)2 |λ, t〉 , σ2T := 〈λ, t | (T − t)2 |λ, t〉 . (4.9)
In the multiplication representation of the time operator, the coherent
state vector |λ, t 〉 in the Lebesgue space L2(R, dx) is given by








Without loss of generality, we can choose the vacuum vector |0, 0〉 of
the Weyl system {W (λ, t) |λ, t ∈ R} as the reference vector Φ of the time
system,
Φ := |0, 0〉 with 〈Φ |T |Φ〉 = 0 , 〈Φ |Λ |Φ〉 = 0 . (4.11)
The covariant transformation of this reference vector under the action of
the group {e−2πitΛ | t ∈ R} is given by e−2πitΛ |0, 0〉 = |0, t〉.
Conclusion: The global description of the timeless universe of discourse




|0, t〉 ⊗ e−itH/ Ψ dt , (4.12)
invariant under the action of the intrinsic unitary group {e−iτG | τ ∈ R} .
5. The Emergence of Time
5.1 Quantum Correlations and Relative States
The timeless description in terms of the global generalized state vector
Ξ gives rise to many relational descriptions. In spite of the fact that
the system as a whole is in a stationary state, dynamical aspects of the
material subsystem are still present in form of quantum correlations. A
long time ago Schro¨dinger (1931, p. 243) proposed to replace the Platonic
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concept of time by correlations. From an epistemic point of view, Rovelli
pointed out that39
“physics is the theory of the relative information that systems have
about each other. . . . Quantum mechanics can therefore be viewed
as a theory about the states of systems and values of physical quan-
tities relative to other systems.”
Starting with a timeless description, all results of traditional quantum
mechanics can be recovered in terms of the correlations and conditional
expectations between the nonmaterial time system and a material object
system.40 In the superposition Ξ =
∫
R
dt |0, t〉⊗e−itK/ Ψ the component
e−itK/ Ψ is considered as the relative state vector of the material domain,
given that the state of the nonmaterial time system is described by the
state vector |0, t〉.
5.2 Every Probability is a Conditional Probability
Normalizable maximally entangled quantum state vectors exist only
in finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. In a probabilistic interpretation they
correspond to uniform probabilities which exist only for compact prob-
ability spaces. Fortunately, a relational probabilistic interpretation re-
quires only conditional probabilities whose definition does neither depend
on bounded measures nor on absolute probabilities.
In Kolmogorov’s mathematical foundation of probability theory condi-
tional probabilities are defined in terms of absolute probabilities. Yet, the
basic notion of probability theory is not an absolute probability but the
notion of the conditional probability P (A|B) of A under the condition B.
An axiomatic theory using the concept of conditional probability as the
primary concept has been developed by Re´nyi.41 This approach avoids
the use of absolute a priori probabilities, nevertheless every result of Kol-
mogorov’s probability theory can be translated into a theory based on
conditional probabilities (cf. Re´nyi 1970b, chapter 2). Moreover, it also
permits the use of unbounded measures. Re´nyi proposed the following
definition for conditional probability spaces.
Let Ω be an arbitrary set, Σ a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, and ΣB
a nonempty subset of Σ. A function P (A|B) of two set-valued variables
A ∈ Σ and B ∈ ΣB is called a conditional probability if and only if it
satisfies for every A ∈ Σ and all B,C,B ∩ C ∈ ΣB the axioms:
39Rovelli (1996). From a different viewpoint, Mermin (1998a,b) also takes the no-
tion of correlation as one of the primitive concepts for an interpretation of quantum
mechanics. In the present discussion, motivation and details are different.
40Compare also Page and Wootters (1983), Wootters (1984), Englert (1990), where
the notion of time is replaced by the notion of correlations between subsystems.
41Re´nyi (1955). Compare also Re´nyi (1970a), chapter II, §11, as well as Re´nyi
(1970b), section 2.2.
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1. P (A|B) ≥ 0, P (B|B) = 1,
2. For each B, P (·|B) is a measure,
3. P (A|B ∩ C)P (B|C) = P (A ∩B|C)
If ν is a (not necessarily bounded) measure on Σ and if ν(B) > 0,
then P (A|B) = ν(A ∩ B)/ν(B) is a conditional probability in the sense
of Re´nyi. Every real- or complex-valued integrable function ω → x(ω)
on the space (Ω,Σ,ν) is also integrable with respect to the measure
A → P (A|B). The corresponding integral E{x|B} = ∫
Ω
x(ω)P (dω|B) is
called the conditional expectation of the random variable x.
5.3 Conditional Expectation of a Material Observable
We consider the description of the timeless universe of discourse in






of the time operator (3.5) as reference. In the material system we select







∣∣ET (T)⊗ 1Ξ〉 , (5.2)
describing the probability of the material event M, given the temporal
event T, satisfies the defining properties for a conditional probability in
the sense of Re´nyi. The quantum correlations between the time system
and the material system are given by the conditional expectation E{A |T}
of the material observable A =
∫
R






∣∣ET (T)⊗ 1Ξ〉 . (5.3)




Φt ⊗ Ψt dt with Φt := e−2πitΛ |0, 0〉 = |0, t〉 ,























∣∣ET (T) ∣∣Φv〉N 〈Ψu∣∣A ∣∣Ψv〉M .
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∣∣ET (T) ∣∣Φr+s〉N 〈Ψr−s∣∣A ∣∣Ψr+s〉M .
Using equation (4.10), we find







4 (x−t)2/σ2T , (5.4)
so that〈
Φr−s






























where A˜r is defined by
A˜r := eirH/Ae−irH/ , (5.5)







with mean r ∈ R and variance σT > 0. The conditional expectation



















∣∣Ψs〉M e− 12 s2/σ2T ∫Tdxµr(dx) . (5.7)
If T is the interval t − ε ≤ x ≤ t + ε, the limit ε → 0 provides the
conditional expectation E{A | t} of the material observable A given that
the nonmaterial time operator T has the mean value t,42

















∣∣Ψs〉M e− 12 (r−t)2/σ2T− 12 s2/σ2T . (5.8)
42Compare Feller (1966), sections III.2, V.9 and V.10.
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∣∣ e−σ2TH2/2A˜r e−σ2TH2/2 ∣∣Ψ〉M .
Conclusion: The conditional expectation of a material observable A,
given that the time operator T has the mean value t, equals
E{A | t} = 〈Ψ̂t∣∣A ∣∣Ψ̂t〉M . (5.9)
The dynamics of the material system is determined by the usual Schro¨din-




= H Ψ̂t , Ψ̂t := e−itH/ Ψ̂0 . (5.10)
However, in contrast to traditional quantum mechanics, the initial state






where the operator e−σ
2
TH
2/2 describes the effects of the Gaussian time
distribution.
5.4 Asymptotically Cartesian Description
The singular case σT = 0 implies a dispersionfree parameter-time. In
this exceptional case the algebra generated by the nonmaterial time op-
erator T lies in the center of the algebra of all observables of the unus
mundus so that quantum correlations between the nonmaterial and the
material system do not exist. This situation corresponds to the so-called
Cartesian separation of the holistic reality into non-entangled mental and
material domains (Primas 1993) which is used in the traditional descrip-
tion of matter in terms of quantum mechanics.
Since in our approach the quantum correlations between the nonmate-
rial and the material domain are crucial, a Cartesian description is possible
only in an asymptotic sense. An expansion in powers of σ2T around the







H2 + O(σ4T )
}
Ψ ,
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corresponds to an asymptotically Cartesian description. If the variance
σ2T of the time operator T is sufficiently small, the correlations between
the nonmaterial and the material domain are small and one finds∥∥Ψt − Ψ̂t ∥∥2 = σ4T 〈Ψ ∣∣∣(H2 − 〈Ψ ∣∣H2 Ψ〉)2Ψ〉 + O(σ6T ) , (5.12)
so that in the limit σ4T 〈(H2−〈H2〉)2〉 → 0 the expectation value 〈Ψ̂t|A |Ψ̂t〉M
of the timeless formulation approaches the expectation value 〈Ψt|A |Ψt〉M
of the traditional parameter-time formulation. For the special case of
two-level systems the Hamiltonian H2 can be taken as a multiple of
the identity, so that we get for all values of σT the exceptional result
E{A | t} = 〈Ψt|A |Ψt〉M.
6. Tentative Conclusions
Clearly, the proposed ideas are of fragmentary and speculative char-
acter so that this essay should be considered as an exercise, whose aim
is not to solve any concrete problem but to discuss new ways of thinking
about the mind-matter problem. Postulating a holistic conception con-
cerning mind and matter and using the non-Boolean logical framework of
quantum theory, we describe mind and matter as complementary aspects
of one holistic reality (unus mundus) in such a way that in the limit of
a Cartesian separation no results of the traditional quantum theory of
matter and radiation are violated. The Leibnizian notion of a noncausal
synchronization of tensed nonmaterial and tenseless material aspects of
the unus mundus can be implemented by representing the timeless state
of the unus mundus as a maximally entangled state with respect to a con-
textual tensorization into a tensed and a tenseless domain. The order
parameter characterizing this continuous-parameter entanglement corre-
sponds to Leibniz’s “order of non-contemporaneous things”. The tensed
domain is the carrier of nonmaterial mental phenomena, while the tense-
less domain is the carrier of nonmental material phenomena.
Since tensed time is not associated with any material system, all tensed
time phenomena are related to the nonmaterial domain. It can be intro-
duced in terms of a Kolmogorov structure, representing a nonmaterial
memory which defines chronological order via the growth of the set of
mental events. This Kolmogorov structure is associated with a nonclas-
sical time operator which induces in the material domain a time variable
with a Gaussian distribution. Only in the Cartesian limit this time vari-
able degenerates into a dispersion-free parameter.
Even if the nonmaterial time system does not interact with the ma-
terial system, it is nevertheless in a nonclassical way strictly correlated
with the material part. Due to the perfect noncausal quantum correla-
tions the dynamical aspects of traditional quantum mechanics of matter
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can be described in terms of the correlations and conditional expectations
between the nonmaterial time system and the material object system. In
the Cartesian limit of vanishing correlations between the nonmaterial and
the material domain, the usual equations of motion are recovered with an
emergent parameter-time as independent variable.
At present, we have insufficient empirical information for a more ex-
haustive mathematical description of the nonmaterial domain. Even so,
many problems which have been considered as difficult or mysterious in
traditional philosophical discussions appear transparent in the proposed
quantum theoretical framework. As examples we may mention:
• In the proposed non-Boolean description, the concepts time, mind
and matter are not given a priori. They refer to a symmetry-broken
description of the unus mundus.
• Time emerges as a universal ordering principle by breaking the time-
less holistic reality into a tensed nonmaterial domain and a tenseless
material domain.
• The concept of “nowness” and the direction of time originate in the
nonmaterial domain.
• The tensed time of the nonmaterial domain is synchronized with the
tenseless time of fundamental physics by quantum correlations.
• The arrow of time is globally unique both in the nonmaterial and
in the material domain.
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